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IN-FLIGHT ICING AND HOW AIRLINES ARE COPING
Wayne L. Golding

I

ABSTRACT

The hazards posed by in-flight icing are an important issue in commercial aviation. Extensive research into
methods for coping with in-flight icing has been continuing for many years. This paper addresses the issues
pertaining to in-flight icing including causes, impact on commercial aviation, and initiatives undertaken to
avoid in-flight icing mishaps today and in the future.
INTRODUCTION
"During 20 minutes of cruise flying in icing
conditions, the airplane's speed decreased from about 200
knots to 158 knots. Just three seconds after the captain
uttered 'severe icing,' the airplane's stall protection system
activated. The radar track of its flight showed the airplane
falling with the dead weight of a brick at a rate of more than
22,000 feet per minute. The circumstances are similar to
those of other events involving various airplane types in
cruise, hold, climb or even descent7'(Dow, 2003, p.1). The
crash of TranAsia Airways Flight GE791 is under
investigation by the Aviation Safety Council (ASC) of
Taiwan. Recently, the ASC issued a bulletin calling upon
French manufacturer Avions de Transport Regional (ATR),
and on regulatory authorities in Taiwan, France and Canada
to emphasize training in crew awareness of icing conditions
(Dow, 2003).
The pilots commented they were in severe icing 73
seconds before the abrupt end of the cockpit voice
recording. The progression from concern to genuine alarm
is all too familiar. They might have recovered with a descent
to warmer levels. Not to go for a rapid descent is to invite
the classic stall, "roll upset" and spin. Once the airplane
starts to auto-rotate into a spin, recovery under the
disorienting conditions at night-as in this case-would have
been difficult. If crews miss the insidious rearward motion
of the elevator trim wheel (or indicator) as speed bleeds off
and angle-of-attack increases to compensate for increased
drag, maybe yet another warning system is in order (Dow,
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2003).
John Dow, a recently retired Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) expert on in-flight icing, said he
could wallpaper a room with digital flight data recorder
tracings of icing incidents and accidents that look like this
crash, based on the details at this early stage in the
postmortem-the steady erosion of speed, the increase in
nose-up trim by the autopilot, perhaps the final addition of
power, and the wrenchingroll and departure from controlled
flight (Dow, 2003).
Dow has described the nature of icing as one where
the insidious trap is set when stall speed increases from ice
buildup on the wing, and then the trap is sprung on a
surprised crew. With insufficient available thrust, the crew
would be unable to accelerate while remaining in level flight
and so would need to unload the airplane by applying nosedown elevator. This method of escape increases airspeed
and reduces angle-of-attack away from the deadly stalling
angle--where lateral control easily can be lost (Dow, 2003).
Where to Expect Icing
Winter weather patterns provide all the right ingredients
to produce major problems with icing. Icing can occur in
both stratiform and cumuliform clouds, but in winter, it's
more likely to be encountered in solid overcast, stratiform
clouds, spread over hundreds of miles. Cumuliform clouds,
in contrast, can produce more intense icing, but the icing
conditions are relatively isolated, especially in winter.
Notably, cumuliform buildups, embedded in warm front
stratus clouds, can cause serious icing (George, 2003).
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Icing typically occurs on the northern side of storm tracks
that often ride winter jet streams, according to Ben
Bernstein, senior research meteorologist at the National
Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colo. The
northernjet over the United Statestends to hug the Canadian
border in the autumn, and then migrates south toward Texas
and Tennessee during winter months, Bernstein explained.
Icing also can be expected on the northern, or colder, side of
surface lows, especially in areas of widespread clouds
(George, 2003).
Icing occurs only if atmospheric moisture is "super
cooled," or cooled below freezing while remaining in liquid
state. When the liquid impinges upon a surface, it freezes,
thereby creating icing. The heaviest icing usually occurs
between -lOC and OC, accumulating as clear icing. It's
especially insidious because accretion is hard to see,
particularly at night. Relatively warm temperatures also are
conducive to formation of larger-diameter water droplets.

Larger droplets can rapidly fonn ice horns or ridges on
airfoil leading edges that can distort airflow. Any ice
buildup on an airfoil increases drag and stall speed (George,
2003).
At colder temperatures, rime ice is more likely to form,
appearing similar to frost buildup in an old freezer. Rime ice
is typically encountered at temperatures between -20C
and -10C. It usually doesn't build up as fast as clear ice
because clouds typically have less liquid water content and
smaller droplets at colder temperatures. Below -20C, for
instance, the probability of encountering ice drops steeply,
although icing has been known to occur at temperatures as
cold as -40C. Below that temperature, all the moisture
within the cloud 6-eezes, thereby eliminating the potential
for icing. Types of aircraft icing are summarized in table 1
(George, 2003).

Table 1. Summary of types of aircraft icing
Icing Type

Clear

. Rime

Temperature
Ranpe
0°C and -10°C
-I OOand-20°C

Associated
Type Cloud
Cumulus

Stratus

Any weather phenomena producing gradual lift can
generate super-cooled water droplets if sufficient moisture
is present. But if the lift is too gentle, then only clouds
develop. If the lift is too rapid, large droplets tend to form,
falling as rain or hail. Sometimes, the droplets will fall as
freezing rain or drizzle below the cloud, an especially
formidable type of icing hazard. Surface weather
observations or forecasts of freezing rain or drizzle, or ice
pellets, indicate a high probability of encountering
significant, if not extreme, icing in the skies or clouds above
(George, 2003).
Effects of Ice
Ice in-flight is always bad news. It destroys the
smooth flow of air, increasing drag while decreasing the
ability of the airfoil to lift. The actual weight of the ice on
the airplane is secondary to the airflow disruption it causes.
As power is added to compensate for the additional drag and
the nose is lifted to maintain altitude, the angle of attack is
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w/

Relative to the
Aircraft
Adheres firmly
Easily removed

Distorts the Airfoil

Less
More

increased, allowingthe undersides of the wings and fuselage
to accumulate ice. Ice accumulates on every exposed part of
the airplane--not just on the wings, propeller, and
windscreen, but also on the antennas, vents, intakes, and
cowlings. It builds in flight where no heat, boots, or deicing
fluid can reach it. It can cause antennas to vibrate so
severely that they break. In moderate to severe conditions,
smaller aircraft can become so iced up that continued flight
is impossible. The airplane may stall at much higher speeds
and lower angles of attack than normal. It can roll or pitch
uncontrollably, and recovery may be impossible (Brown,
1999).
In order to provide a standard for reporting and
describingicing, the aviation communityhas classified icing
into intensities according to the rate of accumulation.
Categories of icing are summarized in table 2 (Dow, 1999).
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Table 2. Summary of categories of icing
Icing Category
Trace
Light
Moderate
Severe

Rate of Accumulation
Slightly greater than the rate of sublimation
May require occasional use of ice protection systems to remove
Frequent use of ice protection systems is necessary
Ice protection systems fail to remove the accumulation of ice

Impact of Icing on Commercial Aviation
According to recent FAA surveys, aircraft crashes
due to icing claim about 30 lives, injure 14 others, and result
in $96 million in property damage annually in the United
States (McGehan,2002). Cancellations and delaysdue to icy
weather can cost airlines millions of dollars in a single day.
On March 20,2000, icing conditions at Denver International
Airport forced Air Wisconsin to cancel 152 flights. United
cancelled 159 outbound and 140 inbound flights the same
day, mostly because of weather ("Airlines Get New Tools to
Avoid In-Flight Icing," 2002).
As David Hinson, then FAA administrator,
explained the agency's position: "Technology has not
advanced to the point of providing a reliable means to assess
in-flight icing conditions with that degree of accuracy or
specificityn(Cole,1997, B 1). By contrast, the National
Transportation Safety Board had urged the FAA to require
installation of new equipment that can "positively
determine" when airplanes are in hazardous icing conditions
(Cole, 1997).
Manufacturers and some pilots also have called for
such upgrades. James Bettcher, a pilot for Delta Air Lines
who serves on the Air Line Pilots Association's special icing
study team, says that ice remains a serious hazard. "If
everyonewho flies knew how bad the situation really is, they
wouldn't stand for it," he says (Cole, 1997, p. 1).
PREVENTING ICING-RELATED MISHAPS
Pilot Training
The coefficient of lift for a clean wing might be
1.60. But with ice contamination it can drop 40% or more to
0.9. As a consequence, stall speed can increase from 110
knots, in this case, to 140 knots. The airplane may give no
warning to the pilot of the new, higher stall speed. At 130
knots or less in this hypothetical example, there is adequate
power to overcome drag. But with the contaminated stall
speed of 140 knots, the airplane loses lift before speed
decreases to 130 knots. Additionally, ice contamination can
cause propeller efficiency to degrade 15% or more. The
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pilot does not have the power to accelerate t o a higher
speed or maintain altitude. The result is the airplane must
descend. The question is whether it will descend under the
control of the pilot or Mother Nature (Dow, 2003).
The following is a simple warning system for
severe icing. At top of the climb, set the airspeed on cruise
speed. When the speed drops 20 knots below that, a warbler
sounds and the pilots are either in a steep turn with power
set or experiencingthe onset of severe icing. The 20-kt band
accommodates a speed variance that might be seen in the
turn as a turboprop executes the reversals of direction in a
lightly iced holding pattern. Dozens of roll upset events
show that pilots are maintaining or attempting to increase
pitch attitude while applying power. This has resulted in
failure to recover fiom the stall and protracted roll
oscillations with altitude loss in excess of 3,000 feet with
several accidents resulting in altitude losses in excess of
10,000 feet (Dow, 2003).
Pilots are being trained to recover using this
technique at first sign of stall, usually stick shaker in lieu of
reducing angle of attack by pitch attitude change or flap
extension if ground contact is imminent or airplane pitch
response is degraded. Stall protection systems may not have
sufficient margin to protect against contaminated stall so that
the stick shaker does not fire or fires at stall onset, instead of
activating in the approach to stall. Insufficient thrust is
available to accelerate airplane out of stall, so stall upset is
protracted and total loss of control may occur (Dow, 2003).
Pilots do not experience this type of event in
training and are not trained to recover. Very few regional
turboprop operatorshave simulators,which can realistically
present these events for pilot training. At first sign of a stall,
which may be stick shaker, uncommanded roll, buffet or
other aerodynamic cues, apply nose down pitch control and
level the wings while advancing RPM and torque until
sufficient increase in airspeed for type. If unable to lower
nose, extend flaps fiom the cruise configuration. Recover,
maintaining higher airspeed than at upset. Retract flaps if
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extended for the recovery (Dow, 2003).
The NTSB recently identified its 2003 "Most
Wanted" aviation safety recommendations, and airframe
structural icing was also included on this year's most
wanted. The board had described the FAA's icing
certification process as "inadequate, and the FAA had not
adopted a systematic and reactive approach to the
certification and operational issues of turboprop-driven
airplane icing."(Fiorino, 2003)
Aviation Directive 97-20- 14 currently requires
incorporating information into the Airplane Flight Manual
that would mandate pilot training before flight into known
or forecast icing conditions after a certain date. AD 97-2014 was the result of the FAA's analysis that the training
level of the pilots of the MU-2B series airplanes made it
difficult for pilots to recognize adverse operating conditions
and operate safely while flying in icing conditions. Since
issuance of AD 97-20-14, a new training video has been
developed that includes information that is critical to safety
of the MU-2B series airplanes. This proposed AD would
require this new video as the mandatory pilot training. The
actions specified by this AD are intended to decrease the
chance of icing-related incidents or accidents of the MU-2B
series airplanes due to pilot error. FAA estimates that this
proposed AD affects 300 airplanes on the U. S. Registry.
The pilot can view the training video in eight hours
(Airworthiness Directives, 2003).
The aviation simulation and training business is
expanding. In addition, the FAA is proposing sweeping
changes that will affect the simulation industry. Innovative
techniques and procedures are evolving to train pilots of
general aviation and air transport aircraftthat take advantage
of the increased simulation capabilities available. As part of
the process, the FAA's Flight Standards Division officials
are meeting with simulator manufacturers and end users to
learn more about new technologies. For example, one area
under discussion is icing (Phillips, 2002)
FAA Aviation Weather Research Proeram
Since 2002, airlines have a new tool for avoiding
in-flight icing, which can threaten smaller commuter planes
and delay larger commercial aircraft as they land or take off.
Current Icing Potential (CIP) is an online display that offers
high-precision maps and plots, updated hourly, to identify
areas of potential aircraft icing produced by cloud drops,
freezing rain, and drizzle. Researchers at the National Center
for Atmospheric Research, with h d i n g from the FAA,
developed new methods and software for detecting and
forecasting icing potential in the atmosphere. They then
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applied these methods to produce CIP, a web-based display
describing current icing conditions. CIP is for use by
meteorologists and airline dispatchers. Its use by pilots and
air traffic controllers is pending FAA approval. A
companiontool, called FIP (Forecast Icing Potential), which
forecasts potential icing up to 12 hours ahead, is still in
development at NCAR and classified as experimental by the
FAA (Airlines Get New Tools to Avoid In-Flight Icing,
2002).
NASA Research Program (Tntelligent Flight Control
Svstem)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) researchers are flying the first set of tests aimed at
creating "smart" flight control software they hope will
someday allow battle-damaged militaryjets.and commercial
jetliners with severe icing to land safely. Researchers at the
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center have started a series
of six to 10 flight tests of the Intelligent Flight Control
System (IFSC). The tests are in support of a NASA effort to
develop neural "network" software that would discover
patterns in the data it receives and modify its behavior
accordingly (Skeen, 2002).
The goal is to develop software that would sense
when an aircraft is damaged and then automatically
manipulate control surfaces -- like flaps, rudders or ailerons
-- to compensate,restoring control to the pilot. The first set
of flight tests involve a "nonlearning" preliminary version of
the neural network software that is pre-trained to the
aerodynamic database of the research aircratl, a highly
modified F-15B fighter. The first of three objectives is to
make sure that the nonlearning parts of the system are
hctioning correctly. These tests will look at the stability
and control of the aircraft. The test aircraft will have two
flight control systems: its regular system to bring the aircraft
up to test altitudes and speeds, and the test s o h a r e (Skeen,
2002). "We are going to attempt to determine the best
maneuvers for online parameter identification -- the
aerodynamic data, stability and control, and handling
qualities," John Bosworth, the project's chief engineer, said
of the second objective. "In addition, for the third objective,
we will be performing handling qualities studies with the
nonlearning system for comparison to the learning system in
order to get more baseline data to compare with simulation
and aerodynamic models" (Skeen, 2002, p. 3).
Neural network software is distinguished by its
ability to observe patterns in the data it receives and
processes and then performs different tasks in response to
new patterns. NASA estimates it will spend about $10
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million over three years on the program, called the
Intelligent Flight Control System. Flight tests of a "selflearning" version of the IFCS software are tentatively
planned for 2003, and an upgraded version is targeted for
evaluation on a U.S. Air Force C- 17 transport in 2005. The
q-17 was chosen because it most closely resembles a jet
airliner. The system is very early in its development.
Military applications of the system are at least five years
away. Civilian applications are at least 10 years away
(Skeen, 2002).
In-Flight Icing Simulation
FENSAP-ICE is an in-flight iaing simulation
system consisting of four modules that can calculate with
great precision and detailed airflow, ice droplets
impingement and ice accretion shapes, as well as estimate
the handling qualities degradation of an iced aircraft. The
system is literally a "Virtual Icing Research Tunnel" at an
engineer's desk, significantly reducing the need for
expensive wind tunnel, icing tunnel and flight-testing. Its
modem technology allows designers to explore and venture
safely even beyond the limits ofthe certificationregulations.
The increase in aircraft safety is considered significant.
Many afiame and engine manufacturers, flight simulation
companies, aircraft accident investigators and aircraft
insurance groupshave already adopted this software system.
Both the Joint Aviation Administration (JAA) and the FAA
have also readily accepted its results in certification (Duns,
2002).
The Kawasaki contract is estimated at $250 000
and is the first contract in Japan. Fred Habashi, President of
Newmercial Technologies International, says: "FENSAPICE has broken the sound of silence in the icing field not
only by being the first commerciallyavailable in-flight icing
software unprotected by national secrecy, but by also
introducing very modem approaches to this field. We have
had considerable success with European and American
companies that have adopted our software over the freely
available software from their National Laboratories, but this
is significant as it is our first contract in Japan and it opens
the doors to other countriesbarred from accessing American
and European technology" (Duns, 2002, p. I).
DeIcersIAnti-Icine Eaui~ment
Anti-icing equipment is turned on before the flight
enters icing conditions. Typically this includes carburetor
heat, prop heat, pitot heat, fuel vent heat, and windscreen
heat. Ice often forms on the propeller before it is visible on
the wing. Props are treated with deicing fluid applied by
slinger rings on the prop hub or with electrically heated
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elements on the leading edges. Ice prevention on props is
preferable to deicing because the ice may not come off the
blades evenly and the unbalanced prop may vibrate badly
(Aircraft Icing,1998)
Deicing equipment is used after ice has built up to
an appreciable amount. There are presently three major
types of wing deicers: boots, weeping wing systems (fluid
deice systems), and heated wings. For the most part, general
aviationaircraft equipped to fly in icing conditions use boots
and, to a lesser extent, weeping wings (Aircraft Icing, 1998).
Boots are strips of rubber that run along the fiont edges of
the wings and the tail surfaces. When ice adheres to those
surfaces, the pilot flips a switch that inflates the boots with
air. As they inflate, the boots expand and the ice breaks
away. The technology is found on most turboprop planes.
Although boots of various designs have been used
successfully for decades, they are not without their flaws.
The boot does not work equally well for ice of all
thicknesses (Paula, 1997).
Years ago, deicers had large, widely spaced
inflation tubes that were slow to inflate. It was necessary to
wait until one-quarter to one-half inch of ice built up on the
boot prior to actuation to prevent the chance of ice bridging,
an arch of ice formed over the top of the inflated tubes. The
bridge could not be broken because its base remained
suspended above the fully inflated boot. Modem deicers,
though, have much narrower inflation tubes and
considerably faster inflation rates. No longer is it necessary
to wait for measurable ice accretion before actuating the
boots. Most approved flight manuals now recommend
actuating the boots at the first sign of ice accretion. But
deicer use instructions vary by make and model of aircraft.
And deicers don't protect all surfaces on the aircraft. Only a
few critical surfaces, such as airfoil, and in some cases strut
and leading edges are protected. Unprotected surfaces can
still accrete ice, thereby increasing drag. For instance,
NASA claims that some aircraft can suffer a 36 percent
increase in drag due to icing, even though the deicers are
functioning properly. The only ways to rid the aircraft of
such ice accretion is to climb to cold, dry air where the ice
can sublimate or descend into warmer air where it can melt
(George, 2003). BFGoodrich, presently the only supplier of
boots in the United States, has introduced a new system that
incorporates ice detection and deicing into one package.
Called "Smartboot," it advises the pilot when to cycle,
confirms boot inflation, and detects any residual ice, making
Smartboot easier to use and more effective than
conventional boots. The sensor's principal component is a 4-
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inchdiameter probe that protrudes about 2 inches through
the strut on the ice detector. Inside the strut are two coils,
one of which vibrates ultrasonically at 40,000 hertz. As ice
builds up on the probe, the probe's vibrational frequency
decreases. The second coil senses the change in frequency.
At a specified frequency shift, which is related to the ice
mass on the probe, an output signal is generated to instruct
the pilots to activate the deicing system. "Being able to read
icing conditions across the 3-foot length of the deicer
provides a whole new level of detection," said Dick
McMuny, ice protection-systems general manager. "It's a
great alternative to single-point ice sensors, where localized
detection may not be sufficient" (Paula, 1997, p.75).
The weeping wing system is a patented alcohol
deicer system that pumps fluid from a reservoir through a
mesh screen embedded in the leading edges of the wing and
tail. Activated by a switch in the cockpit, the liquid flows all
over the wing and tail surfaces, deicing as it flows (Aircraft
Icing, 1998).
Many aircraft are now fitted with ice detectorssmall probes that vibrate at a specific fi-equency. When ice
builds up on the probe, it slows the vibration, activating an
ice alert message in the cockpit. Periodically, the probe is
heated for a few moments, melting the ice so it can detect
subsequent ice accretion (George, 2003).
Jets, with more powerful engines to keep crucial
surfaces free of ice in flight, usually have heated metal
leading edges instead of boots and rarely have icing
difficulties (Hedges, 1998). Furthermore, the cruising
altitudes of these aircraft are generally well above any
precipitation, so ice would only be a potential concern
during takeoffs and landings (Paula, 1997).
THEBUREAUCRACYANDDELAYS
The FAA provides oversight for the largest, busiest
and most complex aviation system in the world. As part of
its mission, the FAA and its staff of 49,000 operate and
maintain our nation's air traffic system, orchestrating the
take-off, landing and routing of 93,000 aircraft a day. The
FAA also regulates aviation safety and security, which
entails standard setting for, and oversight of, commercial
airlines, private aircraft, aircraft manufacturers and the air
traffic system (U.S. Newswire, 2000).
Why does it sometimestake disaster or the passage
of years for the FAA to take significant action? It is
embedded in the conflicted nature of the FAA. Serving two
masters, the agency not only is charged with nurturing the
aviation industry but also must ensure the safety ofthe flying
public. Whenever the FAA considers changes in safety and

Page 38

https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol13/iss3/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2004.1545

equipment regulations, the agency must balance safety
against the cost to airlines. According to records and
interviews, the result can be delays in addressing safety
problems and more accidents related to them. Deadly delays
have occurred in part because a law requires the FAA to
justify the cost of implementing proposed safety measures
by showing that enough lives will be saved (Brazil, 1994).
Despite recommendations from one of its own
safety specialists, the FAA failed to require changes to a
popular commuter aircraft a full year before one of those
planes crashed near Detroit, killing all 29 people on board.
The recommendations in a January 1996 internal FAA
memo called for measures that would allow pilots flying the
30-seat Embraer Brasilia 120to better detect ice building up
on the wings of their planes, known as EMB-120s (Hedges,
1998).
In-flight icing is the suspected cause in the Jan. 9,
1997, crash of Comair-Delta Connection Flight 3272 near
Detroit. Several aviation experts and the Airline Pilots
Association, the nation's largest pilot union, contend that the
fixes would have prevented the crash of Flight 3272. A
Tribune examination shows the FAA did not adopt the
recommendations until last January, two years after the
memo and a year after the Comair crash (Hedges, 1998).
John Dow, a FAA icing expert, wrote a memo after
discovering a trend. There had been six previous cases
involving the EMB-120 since 1989, all of them similar to
the Flight 3272 accident. None resulted in a loss of life, but
each occurred in icy rain which can adhere to the wings and
disrupt airflow (Hedges, 1998).
FAA and Embraer officials refused to discusstheir
actions regarding the EMB- 120. Six U.S. airlines fly a total
of 220 EMB-120s. United Express and Comair fly the plane
in service to O'Hare International and Midway Airports. In
addition to Dow's recommendations, wind tunnel tests
conducted by NASA after the Flight 3272 crash showed that
ice can form on the underside of the EMB-120's wing,
behind deicing devices. According to the pilots union, this
causes drag on the wings, slowing the airplane so much that
it cannot fly. Embraer knew about ice forming behind the
deicers as earIy as 1980, the pilots union argues, when
BFGoodrich Aerospace, which makes the deicing
equipment, predicted it in a study. "ALPA believes that this
accident was avoidable and was caused by the actions (or
inactions) of many organizations," the union report
contends. "There were several significant warnings during
the history of EMB- 120operationsthat should have resulted
in proactive actions to preclude an accident" (Hedges,
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1998).
The crash of Flight 3272 came as the plane was
descending at the end of a 76-minute hop from Cincinnati to
Detroit. Pilots Dann Carlsen and Ken Reece had no
indication that something was going wrong. Trouble began
just after Detroit air controllers ordered the pilots to slow the
plane and then to turn left. As the plane began to turn, it
dramatically lost speed. "Looks like your speed indicator,"
Carlsen told his first officer with professional calm. The
engine power was increased, but the EMB- 120's turn kept
getting steeper, its airspeed lower. "Power," Carlsen
commanded. The plane's bank angle reached 45 degrees,
and then the autopilot disconnected. Suddenly, Flight 3272
flipped onto its back. The plane swung back and forth as the
pilots tried to regain control, but just 29 seconds after the
first hint of trouble, Flight 3272 hurtled into the wet ground
near Monroe, Mich. In less than a half-minute, 29 lives were
ended (Hedges, 1998).
Finally, Dow recommended that if pilots were not
gettingenoughwarningabout ice, the EMB- 120should have
"a reliable means" to assess the danger of ice and to fly out
of it. Icing experts say that would mean installation of an ice
detector, which is one of the fixes the FAA finally adopted,
at a cost of about $16,000 per plane. The improvement came
after the Flight 3272 crash (Hedges, 1998). Embraer and
FAA took additional actions after this event. Embraer
recommended that deice boots be activated at a higher rate,
the autopilot was to be deactivated in icing conditions until
a low speed-alarm had been installed and they released a
revised training video related to flight icing conditions.
Embraer also started to improve the stall-warning computer
icing operations (A History of Disturbing Icing Accidents,
2003).
A four-month Times review of government
documents revealed that in some cases years have passed
and lives have been lost before the FAA acted on safety
problems although the agency had long been aware of the
hazards. Congressional officials have suggested that the
nation's skies would be safer and more efficient if the dayto-day air traffic control operations were taken away fiom
the FAA so it can focus on airline safety issues. (Brazil,
1994).
CONCLUSION
Icing was a contributing factor in at least eight fatal
crashes and many more accidents involving U.S. commercial
aircraft in the last decade, including the 1994 crash of an
American Eagle ATR-72 turboprop in Roselawn, Indiana,
that killed all 68 people on board. Government investigators
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say ice is among the possible causes of the crash of a Comair
twin-engine turboprop that killed 29 people (Cole, 1997).
Despite that history, most aircraft still rely on fairly
primitive systems to monitor ice and remove it; the FAA
literally advises pilots of commuter planes that the best way
to detect hazardous icing is to look out of the window for
telltale signs of buildup. New technologies are available to
alert pilots when ice is forming and break it up more
effectively in flight. This design relies on "smart skin"
technology, fiber optics, specialized software and a
computer chip no more powerful than those found in
ordinary laptops. Genetically, it's called a stress sensor. An
L-shaped epoxy-based patch thinner than a credit card is
fured to the upper side of each wing where it joins the
fuselage. The size of the patch depends on the aircraft, but
a Boeing 747, for example, would require one extending a
couple of feet up the fuselage and the same distance out the
wing. The patch contains a network of hair-like fiber optic
cables, which run through a pencil-size hole in the body of
the plane to a cable connected to a digital-analog converter.
The converter feeds the information to a computer, and
special software interprets the data for the pilot, either on a
screen or through a digitized voice alert (Budris, 1995).
But the FAA has declined to mandate such systems,
arguing that the technology remains largely untested. Even
when the FAA announced a host of proposed new icing
rules, officials focus on stepped-uptraining for pilots, better
weather forecasting and more studies of how ice forms, not
the installation of new hardware (Cole, 1997).
A successful program to avoid icing-related
mishaps must be approved by FAA. Two laws spell potential
delay for installation of icing detection systems by our
airlines. The FAA is required by law to balance safety
against the financial burden to airlines and manufacturers
whenever it considers changes in safety and equipment
regulations. Cost could cause delay by adversely impacting
the smaller airlines in a significant way. Also FAA must
justify the cost of implementing proposed safety measures
by showing that enough lives will be saved (Brazil, 1994).
Even FAA's harshest critics don't believe that the
agency knowingly waits for accidents to happen. But
because the FAA must justify changes that require
expendituresby the aviation industry, the agency sometimes
must use past accidents to help build its case. And once the
agency decides to make safety-related changes, it can take
years before new rules take effect because the agency must
consider the effects on the airline industry. FAA is required
by law to justify rules changes that cause financial burdens
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to government or private industry. Critics say that the FAA,
in seeking changes in regulations, depends too heavily on
accidents that have already occurred. The reason, they say,
is that in an atmosphere of public outrage over a serious
accident, it is easier to pass reforms through Congress.
Before the FAA can act, the agency must calculate how a
proposed safety rule will affect the aviation industry. The
agency must consider everythingfrom the public perceptions
to the economic impact. Critics feel that sometimes safety is
secondary to economic concerns (Brazil, 1994).
The FAA could do more to fund airfhne ice-detection
technologies to help pilots steer clear of dangerous icing
encounters, says Carol Carmody, the former acting chair of
the National Transportation Safety Board. Sensor
manufacturerslike BFGoodrich Aerospace Aircraft Sensors,
developer of an icedetector system that Carmody said could
be acceptable for aircraft if made smaller, may be "waiting

for a sign from the FAA before proceeding." The agency,
however, believes detection technologies have advanced to
the point where no further FAA research dollars are needed.
Said FAA spokesman Les Dorr: "The information we have
from BFGoodrich shows the R&D is at the point where if
they submitted [the design] to us, we could certifjl it." The
FAA, instead, is investing in weather forecasting
technologies that could help pilots avoid icing altogether
(Asker, 200 1).
Icing remains a major threat to flight safety and is a
paramount concern to the aviation industry. Sophisticated
"smart skin" technologies are available to alert pilots when
ice is forming and break it up more effectively in flight. The
cost of implementing and standardizing this technology for
the airlines must be measured by comparing.the30 lives lost
in aircraft crashes due to icing annually in the United States.
This begs the question--when is it time for action?.)

Wayne L. Golding holds an M.S. in Counseling and Guidance from Troy State University and a B.S. in Meteorology fkom Texas
A&M University. He retired from the Air Force in 1995 after 36 years of service, as a weather officer .He is currently an Assistant
Professor of Applied Aviation Sciences at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
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